Restoring Integrity to America’s Financial System
This Presidential Action directs federal agencies to strengthen the integrity and safety of the U.S. financial system by mitigating risks associated with illicit cross-border finance and unsafe lending practices.
The order tasks the Secretary of the Treasury with issuing an advisory detailing red flags for financial abuse related to unauthorized employment and payroll schemes, and proposing changes to Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) regulations to enhance customer due diligence, potentially considering lawful immigration status when assessing risk.
Furthermore, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is directed to clarify that potential deportation and loss of wages should be considered factors in assessing a non-work-authorized borrower's ability to repay a loan, aiming to safeguard the national banking system against structural credit risks.
Arguments For
Strengthening anti-money laundering (AML) and know-your-customer (KYC) protocols protects national security by hindering terrorist financing, narcotics trafficking, and human trafficking facilitated through low-dollar cross-border transfers.
Addressing structural credit risks by ensuring lenders consider potential deportation or loss of wages for non-work-authorized borrowers maintains the safety and soundness of the national banking system.
Restoring integrity involves deterring fraud and abuse by targeting payroll tax evasion schemes, use of shell companies for money laundering, and the misuse of Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITINs) for illicit financial activity.
Providing clear regulatory guidance to financial institutions on recognizing red flags associated with employing unauthorized aliens clarifies compliance expectations and reduces exposure to underground economic activity.
Arguments Against
Enhancing customer due diligence based on perceived immigration status could lead to discriminatory practices or the unfair denial of basic financial services to individuals legally eligible to hold accounts.
Mandating additional identity verification, especially concerning lawful immigration status for credit products, may impose significant compliance burdens and operating costs on financial institutions.
Focusing Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) regulations on immigration status might divert regulatory focus and resources away from traditional financial crime threats, such as sanctions evasion or large-scale corporate fraud.
Changes to "ability-to-repay" standards could introduce ambiguity in underwriting processes, potentially slowing down credit availability for many populations, irrespective of immigration status, if lenders become overly cautious.
Presidential Actions
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:
Section 1. Purpose. America’s financial institutions serve a critical role in safeguarding the American people against financial fraud and abuse. My Administration has taken significant steps to lower the costs of providing financial services for Americans and reduce unnecessary and burdensome Federal regulations that restrain economic growth and hamper the competitiveness of financial service providers nationwide. However, it has long been the policy of the United States to adopt tailored measures to safeguard our financial system from illicit use and promote safe and sound lending and other practices by financial institutions. My Administration will not tolerate national security and public safety risks caused by illicit cross-border financial activity, nor will it permit risks to our financial system posed by the extension of credit or financial services to the inadmissible and removable alien population.
Even the provision of the most basic financial services, absent proper know-your-customer practices, can be abused to facilitate the funding of activities that pose significant threats to national security and public safety. Low-dollar cross-border funds transfers have been used to facilitate or commit terrorist financing, narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, and other illegal activity. Financial trend analyses have uncovered hubs of deadly fentanyl-related financial activity in the United States related to Mexico-based cartels. A recent analysis of Chinese money laundering networks identified how foreign passport holders have used United States-based accounts to facilitate the laundering of over $312 billion for criminal organizations, with human trafficking highlighted among the activities associated with the transfers. Robust customer identification programs and enhanced due diligence measures are necessary to mitigate these risks.
Banks and other financial institutions should also be attentive to the credit risks posed by the extension of mortgage and auto loans, credit cards, and other consumer credit to the inadmissible and removable alien population. Many of those borrowers face the possibility of the loss of wages due to removal or their employers’ decisions to comply with immigration law. Lending to aliens without legal work authorization or who face a substantial loss-of-wage risk creates a structural “ability to repay” deficiency that undermines the safety and soundness of the national banking system. Additionally, employers who violate immigration law may underreport wages, use mismatched or invalid Social Security numbers and taxpayer identification numbers, or fail to properly withhold or remit payroll taxes. Such schemes can create vulnerabilities within our financial system by obscuring income sources, distorting credit underwriting, and facilitating underground economic activity.
It is the policy of my Administration to restore integrity to America’s financial system, safeguard financial institutions against structural risks, and deter fraud and abuse.
Sec. 2. Definition. The term “Federal functional financial regulator” means the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union Administration.
Sec. 3. Safeguarding Against Fraud and Abuse. (a) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury shall issue a formal Advisory to financial institutions regarding the risks associated with the exploitation of the United States financial system by non-work authorized populations and their employers. This Advisory shall describe specific red flags and typologies associated with the following categories of suspicious activity:
(i) evidentiary patterns of payroll tax evasion by employers or labor brokers, including the systematic failure to withhold or remit Federal employment taxes for non-work authorized individuals;
(ii) the utilization of certain foreign-identity documents, nominee accounts, shell companies, or complex “funnel” structures designed to obfuscate the identity of the ultimate beneficial owners or conceal the true nature of payroll disbursements;
(iii) the strategic use of unregistered money services businesses, third-party payment processors, or peer-to-peer platforms to facilitate “off-the-books” wage payments intended to bypass Bank Secrecy Act reporting thresholds or tax obligations;
(iv) patterns of repetitive, sub-threshold cash withdrawals or deposits that correlate with payroll cycles conducted outside of regulated payroll processing systems, also known as “structuring and micro-structuring”;
(v) financial activity indicative of labor trafficking or forced labor (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 1589), where proceeds are commingled with legitimate business revenue or transferred to foreign jurisdictions; and
(vi) the use of an individual taxpayer identification number (ITIN) to obtain credit products or open depository accounts where the applicant lacks verified lawful immigration status. Although an ITIN facilitates tax compliance, its use in lieu of a Social Security number or valid work-authorized visa may be identified as a risk factor requiring enhanced due diligence to ensure the account is not being utilized to facilitate the unlawful employment of unauthorized aliens.
(b) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury shall, in consultation with the appropriate Federal functional financial regulators, propose changes to applicable implementing regulations of the Bank Secrecy Act to strengthen risk-based customer due diligence requirements for covered financial institutions. Such changes should ensure that:
(i) institutions collect and verify sufficient customer identity information to reasonably identify the nominal and beneficial owners of accounts in order to assess risks related to illicit finance, sanctions evasion, fraud, or other unlawful activity; and
(ii) institutions maintain the authority, where warranted by other risk indicators or supervisory concerns, to obtain additional information necessary to resolve material compliance concerns, including information relevant to whether account holders possess lawful immigration status and employment authorization in the United States when such information is relevant to assessing risks associated with fraud, identity misrepresentation, sanctions evasion, or other illicit financial activity, as part of a risk-based customer due diligence program.
(c) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury and the appropriate Federal functional financial regulators shall consider changes to applicable implementing regulations of the Bank Secrecy Act to strengthen risk-based customer identification program requirements for covered financial institutions. Any changes considered should account for the risks foreign consular identification cards pose to the integrity of the United States financial system.
Sec. 4. Addressing Structural Credit Risks. (a) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau shall consider clarifying that potential deportation and loss of wages are factors that could adversely affect a non-work authorized borrower’s ability to repay an extension of credit under the “ability-to-repay” standards in 12 CFR Part 1026 and its appendices and supplements, and that lenders may consider such factors as part of a reasonable and good-faith underwriting determination.
(b) Within 60 days of the date of this order, each appropriate Federal functional financial regulator shall issue guidance regarding the management of the potential credit risks posed by the non-work authorized population.
Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
(d) The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of the Treasury.
DONALD J. TRUMP
THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 19, 2026.
The post Restoring Integrity to America’s Financial System appeared first on The White House.
The document begins by stating that the authority for this action comes from the Constitution and U.S. laws, invoking the President's power to issue orders.
Section 1 establishes the overall purpose, emphasizing the critical role of financial institutions in preventing fraud and abuse.
The Administration states its goal is to reduce burdensome regulations while simultaneously adopting tailored measures to block illicit cross-border financing, like terrorist financing and money laundering, and to prevent credit extension to inadmissible and removable aliens.
This section cites financial trend analyses revealing the use of low-dollar transfers for illegal activities, including fentanyl-related financing linked to cartels and broad money laundering schemes involving foreign passport holders.
It asserts that lending to those without legal work authorization creates a structural deficiency in the "ability to repay" standard, threatening banking soundness, especially when coupled with potential employer wage underreporting.
The policy goal is explicitly stated as restoring integrity to the financial system, safeguarding against structural risks, and deterring fraud.
Section 2 provides a definition, identifying the "Federal functional financial regulator" as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union Administration.
Section 3 mandates actions to safeguard against fraud and abuse.
Within 60 days, the Secretary of the Treasury must issue an Advisory detailing red flags for financial institutions concerning exploitation by non-work-authorized populations and their employers.
This includes patterns of payroll tax evasion, use of complex structures like shell companies to hide beneficial owners, use of payment platforms for "off-the-books" wages, and structuring of sub-threshold cash transactions.
Subsection (a)(vi) specifically addresses the use of an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN) to open accounts or obtain credit when the applicant lacks verified lawful immigration status, noting this requires enhanced due diligence as a risk factor.
Subsection (b) requires the Treasury Secretary, in consultation with regulators, to propose changes to Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) regulations within 90 days to strengthen risk-based customer due diligence.
These changes must ensure institutions can verify customer identity and beneficial ownership, and retain authority to seek additional information, including lawful status, when relevant to assessing risks like fraud or sanctions evasion.
Subsection (c) requires the Treasury and regulators to consider changes to Customer Identification Program (CIP) requirements within 180 days, specifically accounting for risks posed by foreign consular identification cards.
Section 4 addresses structural credit risks.
Within 60 days, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) must consider clarifying that potential deportation and loss of wages are valid factors to consider when evaluating a non-work-authorized borrower's ability to repay a loan under existing underwriting standards (12 CFR Part 1026).
Subsection (b) requires each Federal functional financial regulator to issue guidance within 60 days on managing credit risks posed by the non-work-authorized population.
Section 5 outlines General Provisions for the order, stating it does not impair the authority of executive departments or agencies, nor the budget functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
Subsections (b), (c), and (d) clarify that implementation must adhere to applicable law and available funding, that the order creates no new enforceable legal rights, and assigns the cost of publication to the Department of the Treasury.
The document is signed by Donald J. Trump on May 19, 2026.
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:
The President asserts the constitutional and legal authority under which this executive order is issued and announces that an order follows.
Section 1. Purpose. America’s financial institutions serve a critical role in safeguarding the American people against financial fraud and abuse. My Administration has taken significant steps to lower the costs of providing financial services for Americans and reduce unnecessary and burdensome Federal regulations that restrain economic growth and hamper the competitiveness of financial service providers nationwide. However, it has long been the policy of the United States to adopt tailored measures to safeguard our financial system from illicit use and promote safe and sound lending and other practices by financial institutions. My Administration will not tolerate national security and public safety risks caused by illicit cross-border financial activity, nor will it permit risks to our financial system posed by the extension of credit or financial services to the inadmissible and removable alien population.
This section articulates the order's goals, stating financial institutions must protect the public from fraud.
It positions the action as a necessary, tailored measure to safeguard the system against illicit cross-border financial activities, which pose risks to national security and public safety, and against extending credit to undocumented or removable aliens.
Even the provision of the most basic financial services, absent proper know-your-customer practices, can be abused to facilitate the funding of activities that pose significant threats to national security and public safety. Low-dollar cross-border funds transfers have been used to facilitate or commit terrorist financing, narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, and other illegal activity. Financial trend analyses have uncovered hubs of deadly fentanyl-related financial activity in the United States related to Mexico-based cartels. A recent analysis of Chinese money laundering networks identified how foreign passport holders have used United States-based accounts to facilitate the laundering of over $312 billion for criminal organizations, with human trafficking highlighted among the activities associated with the transfers. Robust customer identification programs and enhanced due diligence measures are necessary to mitigate these risks.
This paragraph provides justification based on national security threats.
It explains that lax Know-Your-Customer (KYC) procedures allow the financial system to be exploited for funding activities like terrorism, drug trafficking, and human trafficking via cross-border transfers.
Specific examples include fentanyl financing linked to Mexican cartels and large-scale money laundering involving foreign passport holders, totaling over $312 billion in one network, underscoring the need for stronger customer identification and due diligence.
Banks and other financial institutions should also be attentive to the credit risks posed by the extension of mortgage and auto loans, credit cards, and other consumer credit to the inadmissible and removable alien population. Many of those borrowers face the possibility of the loss of wages due to removal or their employers’ decisions to comply with immigration law. Lending to aliens without legal work authorization or who face a substantial loss-of-wage risk creates a structural “ability to repay” deficiency that undermines the safety and soundness of the national banking system. Additionally, employers who violate immigration law may underreport wages, use mismatched or invalid Social Security numbers and taxpayer identification numbers, or fail to properly withhold or remit payroll taxes. Such schemes can create vulnerabilities within our financial system by obscuring income sources, distorting credit underwriting, and facilitating underground economic activity.
This part focuses on credit risk within the banking system posed by lending to individuals who are inadmissible or removable.
The concern is that these borrowers risk losing wages upon removal, creating a significant 'ability to repay' deficit that weakens the banking system's safety.
It also links this to illicit employer practices, such as failing to remit payroll taxes or underreporting wages for unauthorized workers.
Such activities obscure income sources, distort proper credit reviews, and encourage an unregulated underground economy.
It is the policy of my Administration to restore integrity to America’s financial system, safeguard financial institutions against structural risks, and deter fraud and abuse.
This sentence summarizes the core policy objective: ensuring the U.S. financial system operates with integrity, protecting institutions from inherent structural weaknesses, and actively discouraging fraudulent and abusive financial practices.
Sec. 2. Definition. The term “Federal functional financial regulator” means the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union Administration.
Section 2 defines the specific federal agencies that oversee financial institutions and are considered 'Federal functional financial regulators' for the purpose of this order.
These are the Federal Reserve Board, OCC, FDIC, and NCUA.
Sec. 3. Safeguarding Against Fraud and Abuse. (a) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury shall issue a formal Advisory to financial institutions regarding the risks associated with the exploitation of the United States financial system by non-work authorized populations and their employers. This Advisory shall describe specific red flags and typologies associated with the following categories of suspicious activity:
Section 3 directs action to prevent illicit finance.
Subsection (a) requires the Treasury Secretary to issue a formal advisory within 60 days to banks about risks posed by unauthorized workers and their employers exploiting the U.S. financial system.
This advisory must detail specific indicators of suspicious activity.
(i) evidentiary patterns of payroll tax evasion by employers or labor brokers, including the systematic failure to withhold or remit Federal employment taxes for non-work authorized individuals;
The first category of suspicious activity outlined for the advisory involves clear patterns of payroll tax evasion by employers or labor brokers, specifically when they fail to withhold or send in required Federal employment taxes for individuals not authorized to work.
(ii) the utilization of certain foreign-identity documents, nominee accounts, shell companies, or complex “funnel” structures designed to obfuscate the identity of the ultimate beneficial owners or conceal the true nature of payroll disbursements;
The second category details the use of suspicious structures or documents, such as foreign IDs, nominee accounts, or complex 'funnel' arrangements.
These methods are designed to hide who truly owns money or profit from payrolls.
(iii) the strategic use of unregistered money services businesses, third-party payment processors, or peer-to-peer platforms to facilitate “off-the-books” wage payments intended to bypass Bank Secrecy Act reporting thresholds or tax obligations;
The third type of activity involves using unregistered money services, third-party processors, or peer-to-peer payment systems to make wage payments "off-the-books." This is done intentionally to avoid Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) reporting requirements or tax liabilities.
(iv) patterns of repetitive, sub-threshold cash withdrawals or deposits that correlate with payroll cycles conducted outside of regulated payroll processing systems, also known as “structuring and micro-structuring”;
The fourth indicator involves repetitive cash deposits or withdrawals just below regulated reporting amounts that align with typical payroll schedules.
This technique, called structuring or micro-structuring, occurs when payments bypass official payroll systems.
(v) financial activity indicative of labor trafficking or forced labor (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 1589), where proceeds are commingled with legitimate business revenue or transferred to foreign jurisdictions; and
The fifth point flags financial activity that suggests labor trafficking or forced labor, as defined in federal law (18 U.S.C. § 1589).
This is often identified when the criminal proceeds are mixed with legitimate company income or sent overseas.
(vi) the use of an individual taxpayer identification number (ITIN) to obtain credit products or open depository accounts where the applicant lacks verified lawful immigration status. Although an ITIN facilitates tax compliance, its use in lieu of a Social Security number or valid work-authorized visa may be identified as a risk factor requiring enhanced due diligence to ensure the account is not being utilized to facilitate the unlawful employment of unauthorized aliens.
The final category concerns using an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN) to get credit or open bank accounts when the applicant does not have verifiable lawful immigration status.
While ITINs are for tax compliance, using one instead of a Social Security Number or work visa signals a risk factor requiring extra checks to ensure the account does not support illegal employment.
(b) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury shall, in consultation with the appropriate Federal functional financial regulators, propose changes to applicable implementing regulations of the Bank Secrecy Act to strengthen risk-based customer due diligence requirements for covered financial institutions. Such changes should ensure that:
Subsection (b) mandates that the Treasury Secretary, working with the Federal functional financial regulators, must propose changes to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) regulations within 90 days.
The goal of these proposed changes is to reinforce the risk-based due diligence required from covered financial institutions.
(i) institutions collect and verify sufficient customer identity information to reasonably identify the nominal and beneficial owners of accounts in order to assess risks related to illicit finance, sanctions evasion, fraud, or other unlawful activity; and
The first requirement for the proposed BSA changes necessitates that institutions gather and verify enough identity information to accurately identify both the named account holders and the beneficial owners.
This is crucial for assessing risks like illicit financing, sanctions violations, or fraud.
(ii) institutions maintain the authority, where warranted by other risk indicators or supervisory concerns, to obtain additional information necessary to resolve material compliance concerns, including information relevant to whether account holders possess lawful immigration status and employment authorization in the United States when such information is relevant to assessing risks associated with fraud, identity misrepresentation, sanctions evasion, or other illicit financial activity, as part of a risk-based customer due diligence program.
The second requirement ensures institutions retain the right, based on risk indicators or supervisory findings, to ask for extra data to address compliance issues.
This includes the authority to ask about lawful immigration and employment status if that information is necessary to properly gauge risks like fraud or sanctions evasion within their existing risk-based diligence process.
(c) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury and the appropriate Federal functional financial regulators shall consider changes to applicable implementing regulations of the Bank Secrecy Act to strengthen risk-based customer identification program requirements for covered financial institutions. Any changes considered should account for the risks foreign consular identification cards pose to the integrity of the United States financial system.
Subsection (c) sets a deadline of 180 days for the Treasury Secretary and regulators to examine adjustments to Customer Identification Program (CIP) rules under the BSA. Any potential changes must specifically address the risks that foreign consular identification cards introduce to the integrity of U.S. financial operations.
Sec. 4. Addressing Structural Credit Risks. (a) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau shall consider clarifying that potential deportation and loss of wages are factors that could adversely affect a non-work authorized borrower’s ability to repay an extension of credit under the “ability-to-repay” standards in 12 CFR Part 1026 and its appendices and supplements, and that lenders may consider such factors as part of a reasonable and good-faith underwriting determination.
Section 4 targets credit risks.
Subsection (a) requires the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to consider clarifying existing "ability-to-repay" rules (12 CFR Part 1026) within 60 days.
The clarification should confirm that potential deportation or loss of wages can negatively impact a non-work-authorized borrower's repayment capability, allowing lenders to formally consider these factors during underwriting.
(b) Within 60 days of the date of this order, each appropriate Federal functional financial regulator shall issue guidance regarding the management of the potential credit risks posed by the non-work authorized population.
Subsection (b) directs every appropriate Federal functional financial regulator to issue related guidance within 60 days.
This guidance must specifically address how regulated institutions should manage the potential credit risks that arise from lending to the population not authorized to work in the United States.
Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
Section 5 addresses the general legal parameters of the document.
Subsection (a) specifies that the order cannot be interpreted as limiting or negatively affecting authorities granted by law to any executive department or agency or its head.
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
This clause clarifies that the order does not override or impair existing legal authority held by any executive department or agency, or by the individual leading that entity.
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
This clause ensures that the order does not interfere with the authority of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) concerning budget proposals, administrative planning, or legislative initiatives.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
Subsection (b) mandates that all implementation actions must comply with existing laws and are contingent upon the availability of necessary funding appropriated by Congress.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Subsection (c) is a standard legal disclaimer stating that the executive order does not create any new enforceable legal rights or benefits, either substantively or procedurally, for any person or entity suing the United States government or its representatives.
(d) The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of the Treasury.
Subsection (d) assigns fiscal responsibility, directing the Department of the Treasury to cover all costs associated with officially publishing this Executive Order.
DONALD J. TRUMP
THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 19, 2026.
This concludes the document, indicating it was signed by President Donald J. Trump at the White House on May 19, 2026.
Related
Integrating Financial Technology Innovation into Regulatory Frameworks
* Federal financial regulators received directives to review regulations impeding financial technology innovation, while the Federal Reserve was requested to evaluate direct access to payment services for non-bank financial companies.
Read MoreNominations Sent to the Senate
The President formally forwarded a list of individuals to the Senate for confirmation to various federal judicial positions, including District Judges and Circuit Judges.
Read MorePeace Officers Memorial Day and Police Week, 2026
* The President proclaimed May 15, 2026, as Peace Officers Memorial Day and May 10 through May 16, 2026, as Police Week, calling for flags to be flown at half-staff and honoring those in law enforcement.
Read MoreNominations and Withdrawal Sent to the Senate
The President transmitted multiple nominations for various government roles to the Senate and formally withdrew one previous nomination.
Read More